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ENHANCING NDPB ACCOUNTABILITY: IMPROVING RELATIONSHIPS WITH 
UPWARD AND DOWNWARD STAKEHOLDERS 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the relationship between Northern Ireland Non-departmental Public 
Bodies (NDPBs) and two key stakeholders, sponsoring government departments and service 
users, and outlines how this relationship can impact upon a NDPB discharging its 
accountability responsibilities effectively. After discussing the concept of accountability, the 
paper presents the findings of a survey of, and interviews with, NDPB board members. Whilst 
the consensus was that NDPBs were effective in discharging accountability, there was 
frustration with an apparent absence of an arms’ length relationship with certain sponsoring 
departments and limited engagement with service users. 
 
Key Words: Accountability, Governance, Non-departmental Public Bodies (NDPBs), 
Stakeholders 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
An arm’s-length body (ALB) (or semi-autonomous agency) is an organization that delivers a 
public service, is not a ministerial department, and which operates to some extent at a distance 
from ministers. Whilst such bodies are used globally, the term in the United Kingdom (UK) 
can include non-departmental public bodies (NDPBs), executive agencies, non-ministerial 
departments, public corporations, National Health Service bodies and inspectorates. NDPBs 
are bodies which are part of Central Government but not government departments, or part of 
one, and this, along with their purported arm’s length relationship with ministers, means that 
they are independent, whilst operating within a framework of ministerial accountability and 
control (Cabinet Office 2015). There are three main types of NDPB: (i) ‘Executive’, which 
undertake executive, administrative, regulatory and/or commercial functions (e.g. 
Environment Agency and Health and Safety Executive); (ii) ‘Advisory’, which provide 
independent advice to ministers on particular topics of interest (e.g. Low Pay Commission, 
and Committee on Standards in Public Life); and (iii) ‘Tribunal’, which have jurisdiction in a 
specialized field of law (e.g. Traffic Commissioners and Valuation Tribunal) (Office of the 
First Minister and Deputy First Minster (OFMDFM) 2014; Cabinet Office 2015). A fourth 
‘Other’ category of NDPB includes independent monitoring boards attached to prison 
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establishments and immigration removal/holding facilities, health and social care (HSC) 
bodies (which are prevalent in Northern Ireland (NI)) and public corporations (OFMDFM 
2014; Cabinet Office 2015). 
Since the 1980s, governments around the world have promoted the creation of ALBs on 
the basis that this will bring improvements in public sector performance (Pollitt et al. 2001; 
Verhoest et al. 2012); indeed, it is contended that such bodies have become indispensable to 
modern government globally (Skelcher et al. 2013). The reasons for this include ALBs: 
prevent minsters from becoming overloaded; bring expert advice to complex policy issues; 
and undertake regulatory and quasi-judicial tasks that need to be politically independent 
(Skelcher et al. 2013). However, the application of the ‘agency’ model and the concept of 
‘agencification’ or ‘agentification’ differ from country to country with different terms being 
used for ALBs; for example, special operating agencies in Canada and state enterprises in 
Finland and New Zealand (Wettenhall 2005). Moreover, Overman and van Thiel (2016) 
outlined the different levels of agencification in twenty countries, with these ranging from all 
public services being provided by agencies in Lithuania to less than half in Switzerland; in the 
UK, this was approximately 80 per cent. These authors also tested the claims that such bodies 
improve performance at the macro level, and reported a negative effect on both public sector 
output and efficiency, thus refuting the economic claims underlying agencification 
programmes. 
Building on the Nolan principles (Committee on Standards in Public Life 1995), the 
Independent Commission on Good Governance in Public Services (2004) developed six 
common principles of good governance for public service organizations that are intended to 
help those with an interest in public governance to assess good practice. Accordingly, good 
governance means: (i) focusing on the organization’s purpose and on outcomes for citizens 
and service users; (ii) performing effectively in clearly defined functions and roles; (iii) 
promoting values for the whole organization and demonstrating good governance through 
behaviour; (iv) taking informed, transparent decisions and managing risk; (v) developing the 
capacity and capability of the governing body to be effective; and (iv) engaging stakeholders 
and making accountability real. This latter point requires a relationship and a dialogue, and 
for organizations to understand to whom, and for what, they are accountable. As it involves 
not only reporting on what has happened but also engaging with stakeholders to plan future 
activities, it is consistent with accountability being viewed in the context of stakeholder 
theory (Freeman 2010). 
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Despite initiatives by the UK government that aimed to reform public bodies (see 
Skelcher et al. 2013) the House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee 
(HoCPASC) (2014) raised a number of concerns about their accountability, contending it was 
transactional in nature, with an insufficient emphasis on the human factors, confused and 
neglected. HoCPASC (2014) also advised the Government to promote good relationships 
between Central Government and public bodies. It is against this backdrop of issues with 
NDPBs’ accountability that this paper aims to answer the following research question: how 
do the relationships NI NDPBs have with two key stakeholders, sponsoring government 
departments and service users, impact upon their ability to discharge their accountability 
responsibilities effectively? The paper highlights certain problems that these NDPBS face 
with regard to relationships and accountability and also offers some solutions that may be of 
benefit to other public sector organisations, both in the UK and other jurisdictions. In terms of 
structure, the next three sections provide background to the study, including recent changes 
imposed on public bodies, outline the structure of government in NI and discuss the notion of 
accountability and how it is operationalized by NDPBs. The research method is then 
explained before the results of a survey of, and interviews with, NDPB board members are 
presented. Finally, the findings are discussed and conclusions drawn. 
 
BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT 
 
In May 2010, the UK Coalition Government pledged to reform public bodies in its 
Programme for Government, emphasizing two key objectives: saving money and increasing 
accountability (Skelcher et al. 2013). However, while the reforms have led to significant 
reductions in the number of public bodies, this has often involved all or some of the functions 
being transferred to a new ALB, a government department or local council or the not-for-
profit or business sectors (Skelcher et al. 2013). Thus, significant savings are unlikely if all 
that has changed is the organizational location of a function and not the specific functions 
themselves. Moreover, Skelcher et al. (2013) also contend that there is a tension between the 
centrifugal forces underlying the civil service reform plan’s ambition for enhanced delivery 
and the centripetal forces of improved accountability that in part motivated the public bodies’ 
review. For example, while integrating a NDPB into a departmental line management system 
may theoretically increase ministerial accountability, the functions may become a relatively 
minor component of the department and therefore receive less scrutiny and attention. 
Similarly, Tonkiss (2016) reports tensions between independence and accountability, which 
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come to the fore in periods of fiscal stress as governments employ financial management tools 
to regulate the use of resources by ALBs. 
In addition to the matters referred to above, and whilst acknowledging that the UK 
Government has reformed ALBs (including NDPBs), the HoCPASC (2014) argued: for a 
taxonomy of public bodies to simplify state structures; that accountability primarily depends 
on relationships; that any disagreements between Central Government and public bodies are 
open and honest; and there is learning from mistakes. HoCPASC (2014) also expressed 
concern that public appointments are not sufficiently transparent, representative or 
accountable, which is alarming given their importance to the effectiveness and accountability 
of public bodies.  
The Cabinet Office (2015) reported on the completion of the 2010 Public Bodies Reform 
Programme, the objectives of which were to, inter alia, improve transparency and 
accountability. In contrast to the tone of HoCPASC (2014), the Cabinet Office (2015) claimed 
amongst its achievements: improved accountability, by moving the functions of over 75 
bodies closer to democratically elected representatives; and increased transparency, by 
simplifying the public bodies’ landscape by abolishing and merging a number of public 
bodies, together with an increased percentage of NDPBs publishing an annual report and 
making minutes available to the public. By 31 March 2015, following the completion of the 
Programme, the number of public bodies under the aegis of Westminster departments had 
been reduced by over 290; over 190 had been abolished and 165 had been merged into fewer 
than 70, leaving 403 NDPBs (Executive - 111; Advisory – 146; Tribunal – 13; and Other – 
133) (Cabinet Office 2015).  
Having provided a background and context to the current environment in which NDPBs 
are operating in the UK, the next section outlines the structure of government in NI in order 
clarify the setting for the research presented later in this paper. 
 
STRUCTURE OF DEVOLVED GOVERNMENT IN NORTHERN IRELAND 
 
Following referendums in Scotland and Wales in 1997, and in NI in 1998, the UK Parliament 
transferred a range of powers to national parliaments or assemblies. The Scottish Parliament, 
the National Assembly for Wales and the NI Assembly were established and took control in 
1999. The arrangements are different for each, reflecting their history and administrative 
structures. The structure of devolved government in NI is illustrated in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1: Structure of devolved government in Northern Ireland 
 
NI Assembly 
(90 MLAs in the NI Assembly) 
  
  
NI Executive 
(First Minister, Deputy First Minister, two Junior Ministers and eight other government 
ministers (each with responsibility for a specific department, excluding Department of 
Justice)) 
  
  
9 Departments 
(Executive Office; Department of Agriculture, Environment & Rural Affairs; Department 
for Infrastructure; Department for the Economy; Department of Education; Department of 
Finance; Department of Health; Department for Communities; and Department of Justice) 
 
The NI Assembly is the prime source of authority for all devolved responsibilities in NI. Until 
2016, it had 108 members (MLAs) elected from 18 six-member constituencies. However, the 
number of MLAs per constituency was reduced from six to five with effect from 2017, 
resulting in 90 seats in the March 2017 election. The elected MLAs appoint the executive 
arm, the NI Executive, which is the devolved government for NI. The NI Assembly can make 
legislation in those areas which have been ‘transferred’ from Westminster (e.g. economic and 
social matters, agriculture and rural development, culture, arts, education, health, social 
services and public safety), with Westminster retaining legislative authority for defence and 
national security, foreign policy, immigration and energy.  
The NI Executive comprises the First Minister, the Deputy First Minister, two Junior 
Ministers and eight other government ministers. The First Minister and Deputy First Minister 
are nominated by the largest and second largest political parties respectively and act as joint 
chairs of the NI Executive. Departmental ministers, with the exception of the Minister of 
Justice, are nominated by the political parties in the NI Assembly according to their share of 
seats (calculated using the d’Hondt method of proportional representation (Bogdanor 2001)). 
The Minister of Justice is appointed following a cross-community NI Assembly vote. With 
effect from May 2016, the number of government departments in NI was reduced from 12 to 
nine, with their role, together with their executive agencies, NDPBs and other ALBs, being to 
implement government policy and advise ministers.  
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ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
This paper considers how the relationship between NI NDPBs and two key stakeholders, 
sponsoring government departments and service users, can impact upon the discharge of 
accountability by NDPBs. With the previous two sections outlining the environment in which 
NDPBs operate in the UK and the structure of government in NI, this section presents the 
theoretical underpinning for the paper. After reflecting on what is meant by accountability, it 
examines to whom and in what ways NDPBs are accountable before concluding by 
considering how accountability is operationalized. 
 
What is accountability? 
 
Accountability is widely recognized as a fundamental element of democratic government 
(Ashworth, Boyne, and Walker 2001), with Gray, Owen, and Adams (1996, 38) defining it as 
the ‘duty to provide an account (by no means necessarily a financial account) or reckoning of 
those actions for which one is held responsible’. This is consistent with notions of political 
accountability, whereby elected politicians are held accountable for policy decisions, and 
financial and legal accountability, whereby public organizations must comply with financial 
reporting regulations. New Public Management reforms have arguably widened expectations 
of who should be held accountable to senior pubic service officials, with the public expecting 
a minimum level of service and information on efficiency and effectiveness (Power 1997). 
Previous research has often considered accountability in the context of stakeholder theory 
(Gray, Bebbington, and Collison 2006; Mäkelä and Näsi 2010), a theory developed from 
studies of corporate organizational behaviour (Freeman 2010) which posits that an 
organization is in various relationships with internal and external parties known as 
stakeholders. The central argument is that if organizations engage with stakeholders on a basis 
of mutual trust and cooperation (a key tenet of HoCPASC (2014)), they will build legitimacy 
and reputation and gain competitive advantage (Donaldson and Preston 1995; Jones and 
Wicks 1999; Freeman 2010). This suggests that organizational survival and success need 
stakeholder support, which requires management to legitimate organizational activities to 
stakeholders by demonstrating the organization’s values, beliefs and successes (Samkin and 
Schneider 2010). Additionally, accountability has been examined in terms of the role and 
value of different accountability mechanisms (O’Dwyer and Unerman 2007) and its play-out 
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in organizations (Ezzamel et al. 2007), including taking responsibility for actions and 
behaviours towards constituents (Ebrahim 2003a; Cooper and Owen 2007).  
 
To whom and in what ways are NDPBs accountable? 
 
Any definition of a stakeholder must take into account the stakeholder-organization 
relationship. Whilst acknowledging that different definitions are used for identifying 
stakeholders, they tend to be either broad and inclusive or narrow and pragmatic. Although 
Freeman’s (2010) well-established broad definition, that a stakeholder is any group or 
individual who can affect or be affected by an organization, reflects the important bi-
directionality of stakeholders, it arguably allows anyone to be classified as a stakeholder. 
Freeman (2010) further distinguishes between primary (e.g. consumers, suppliers, employees 
and the community) and secondary (e.g. media, competitors, financial institutions and public 
interest groups). The former are considered vital to the persistence of the organization, with 
their withdrawal potentially leading to the organization’s cessation. Whilst the latter are also 
important to the organization in the context of their relationship, the persistence of the 
organization does not depend on secondary stakeholders. In comparison, other definitions 
take an arguably more pragmatic approach by emphasizing legitimacy (‘persons or groups 
with legitimate interests in procedural and/or substantive aspects of corporate activity’ 
(Donaldson and Preston 1995, 85)). In other words, an entity must have a legitimate claim or 
stake in the organisation to be considered a stakeholder. These narrow definitions accept the 
reality that managers cannot or do not consider all possible stakeholders.  
Noting that definitions such has those presented above tended to focus on either power or 
legitimacy (i.e. the power of an organization over a stakeholder and vice versa, or the 
legitimacy of a stakeholder’s claim on an organization), Mitchell, Agle and Wood (1997, 864) 
contended that they ignored urgency (i.e. ‘the degree to which stakeholder claims call for 
immediate attention’). Considering the principle, proposed by Freeman (2010), of ‘who and 
what really counts’, Mitchell, Agle and Wood (1997) argue that the first question calls for a 
normative theory, which logically defines who should be considered as stakeholders; while 
the second requires a ‘descriptive theory of stakeholder salience’, which explains what 
conditions are in place when managers consider certain people or entities as stakeholders 
(853). They argue that once stakeholders are identified, organizations determine ‘who or what 
really counts’ and rank competing stakeholder claims. Stakeholders who are perceived to 
have power, legitimacy and urgency are deemed the most salient and their claims are likely to 
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be prioritized. Power, it is suggested, reflects the extent to which a stakeholder has or can gain 
access to coercive, utilitarian or normative means to impose its will on an organization. For 
stakeholders to have legitimate claims, such entitlements must be consistent with social norms 
and expectations (e.g. through a contractual or moral connection with the organization, or by 
bearing some risk as a result of an organization’s activities). Urgency represents the degree to 
which stakeholder claims justify immediate attention based on either the time-sensitivity or 
criticality of the claim. The organization would be expected to prioritize the needs of 
stakeholders who are perceived to possess all three attributes (‘definitive stakeholders’, 878). 
The perceived salience of other stakeholders would be less, due to them demonstrating fewer 
attributes; for example, ‘dependent stakeholders’ (877) might have legitimate claims but need 
the power of others to pursue them, and ‘discretionary stakeholders’ (875) may have 
legitimacy but no power to compel an organization’s attention (but which may be given at its 
discretion). Stakeholders’ salience, that is, the degree to which their influence(s) affect 
organizational activities, determine the hierarchical structure, with definitive stakeholders 
being given immediate priority.  
In exploring the outworking of stakeholder theory, Donaldson and Preston (1995) 
describe two distinct motivations (instrumental and normative) on why organizations do or do 
not take account of stakeholder needs in their decision making. Consistent with Mitchell, 
Agle, and Wood (1997), their instrumental view is considered to typify the approach adopted 
by most corporate organizations, which is that businesses prioritize the interests of those who 
hold the greatest economic power and influence to ensure their own success and survival 
(consistent with Freeman’s (2010) primary stakeholders); thus suggesting competing 
stakeholders. In comparison, the normative perspective contends that individuals have a moral 
duty to embrace each other’s needs and opinions. In an organizational context, all 
stakeholders are therefore treated equitably and participation is promoted sincerely. 
Accordingly, in contrast with Mitchell, Agle, and Wood (1997), power differentials between 
accountees and accountors are deemed inconsequential and a partnering relationship is 
considered more appropriate than a controlling one often associated with a more business-
related instrumental view (Cornforth 2003; HoCPASC 2014). This kind of substantive 
commitment to all stakeholders might involve trading off the (economic) interests of one 
group against those of another. Freeman (2010) suggests that both the owners (shareholders) 
and other stakeholders have a right to demand certain actions from management because they 
all have a vested stake in the business. However, saying this makes everyone equal when, 
according to Mitchell, Agle and Wood (1997), they are really not. 
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Fry (1995) and Gregory (1995) also distinguish between the instrumental view’s 
externally-focussed notion of accountability and an internal dimension motivated by a felt 
responsibility. For NDPBs, this latter form of accountability should perhaps be an intrinsic 
feature of how they operate in fulfilling their responsibilities and ensuring that public trust is 
served. However, balancing external accountability (e.g. to a government department) and felt 
responsibility (e.g. to service users) may create tension (Fry 1995). As organizations seeking 
an equitable society, NDPBs might be expected to adopt the normative model (Donaldson and 
Preston 1995); therefore, accountability would be an intrinsic feature of their operations, with 
its outworking reflecting the characteristics of the normative perspective (Ebrahim 2003a). To 
the extent that NDPB practices are aligned with this model, their actions and discourse in 
communications (e.g. annual reports) will be characterized by openness and transparency in 
order to meet the (information) needs of all stakeholders equitably. In contrast, if an 
organization’s actions and discourse reflect the instrumental model (Donaldson and Preston 
1995), they will be utilized to convey that its practices align with stakeholder expectations 
and values, without this necessarily being the case. Accordingly, the accountability system 
may be dominated by self-promotion and techniques of impression management (Chen and 
Roberts 2010; Beelitz and Merkl-Davies 2012).  
Roberts (1991, 385), who observes that ‘different forms of accountability produce very 
different senses of our self and our relation to others’, presents two contrasting forms of 
accountability: hierarchical and socialising. Based upon Foucault’s (1979) notion of 
disciplinary power (i.e. the power exercised by those who represent the sovereign authority in 
everyday transactions by their own or the sovereign’s rules), Roberts defines hierarchical 
forms as those that create in those held accountable a mental absorption with the self and with 
how one is seen; this is typically through institutionalized and invisible channels of 
disciplinary power. In contrast, Roberts claims that socialising forms can produce a more 
rationally-grounded consensus. While these forms also aim at confirming the self, they 
acknowledge the interdependence of the self and the other and are characterized by a relative 
absence of power inequalities. In contrast to hierarchical forms, socialising forms promote 
dialogue, engagement and reciprocal recognition, resulting in acknowledgement of the other.  
Albeit using different terms, Laughlin (1996) categorizes accountability in a similar 
manner to Donaldson and Preston (1995) and Roberts (1991). His contractual accountability 
equates to instrumental/hierarchical accountability, while communal accountability is aligned 
with normative/socialising forms. Laughlin (1996) argues that contractual accountability 
exists in formal relationships where actions, including information demand and supply, are 
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clearly defined in enforceable terms, often through the judicial process (Dubnick 1998). In 
contrast, communal accountability occurs in less-formal relationships, where expectations 
over conduct and information demand and supply are less-clearly defined. This involves 
meeting stakeholders’ needs through consultation and seeking their involvement in the 
decision-making process. Laughlin (1996) attributes the different forms of accountability to 
the potential for trust and value conflict between principals and agents. He contends that 
formal mechanisms are less important where there is a high inter-party trust, as it is assumed 
that the agent will fulfil the principal’s expectations. In contrast, if trust is low, the principal is 
likely to place greater reliance on formal and contractual mechanisms to exert control over the 
agent’s behaviour. Similarly, with respect to value conflict, if the principals’ and agents’ 
values are aligned, communal accountability is more likely; if this is not the case, the 
principal may employ more contractual forms of accountability.  
 
How is accountability operationalized? 
 
Depending on the stakeholders involved, contractual (instrumental/hierarchical) and 
communal (normative/socialising) accountability may be discharged differently. For example, 
reports may be contractually required by ‘upward’ stakeholders (e.g. the sponsoring 
department), whilst communal accountability is more likely to be provided ‘downward’ (e.g. 
to service users) in a less-structured format (Broadbent, Dietrich, and Laughlin 1996). As 
upward accountability may be linked to ensuring that organizational funds are utilized 
effectively and efficiently, NDPBs can gain legitimacy from their upward stakeholders by 
reporting the financial aspects of their activities. However, there is often a disparity in the 
power of downward stakeholders, compared to upward stakeholders. While the limited power 
of downward stakeholders may discourage NDPBs from discharging accountability, NDPBs 
being value-driven organizations may provide a counterbalance. This may generate intangible 
sources of legitimacy such as credibility, reputation and trust, with increased consultation and 
participation leading to more appropriate and effective management. Downward 
accountability is consistent with Fry’s (1995) notion of felt responsibility and transfers the 
right of accountability from those in a position of power to enforce it to those affected by an 
organization and its activities.  
In practice, upward and downward accountability may represent end-points on a 
continuum; furthermore, upward stakeholders may bolster the position of downward 
stakeholders (for example, by making beneficiary participation a funding condition). 
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Reflecting such considerations, O’Dwyer and Unerman (2007) discuss the concept of holistic 
accountability which encompasses multi-directional accountability, not just upward and 
downward, between different stakeholders. They argue that this is desirable from both a 
practical perspective, as it helps ensure that organizations are aware of the most effective 
ways to deploy finite funding, and from a moral perspective, as it helps discharge 
accountability derived from felt responsibilities.  
Operationally, there are multiple instruments of accountability. Public discourse enables 
organizations to communicate with constituents and demonstrate that they are operating 
responsibly (Samkin and Schneider 2010). This can be employed to shape stakeholder 
perceptions and expectations to ensure that organizational behaviours are (or perceived to be) 
aligned with societal values (Gray, Bebbington, and Collison 2006). Such mechanisms 
include the statutory annual report1 and other voluntary documents that organizations publish 
for stakeholder consumption. Supplementary accountability mechanisms include: 
participation, where organizations engage with (downward) constituents and involve them in 
decision making; and the adoption of standards and codes of conduct which convey 
appropriate and accountable behaviour (Ebrahim 2003b). In practice, accountability 
mechanisms operate collectively and connectedly. Codes of conduct may, for example, 
inform attempts to account through discourse, while simultaneously the (self-imposed) 
pressures to account through discourse may encourage the adoption of specific standards.  
In relation to public bodies, HoCPASC (2014) states that being accountable means taking 
responsibility for actions, with examples of accountability mechanisms including responding 
to Parliamentary questions, holding board meetings in public, taking the views of stakeholders 
into account and publishing an annual report and accounts. The annual report is often viewed 
as the principal, formal means through which management communicates with their (often 
predominantly upward) stakeholders (Yuthas, Rogers, and Dillard 2002). As the 
communication lens through which stakeholders can understand and monitor organizations’ 
activities, successes and failures, it occupies a prominent position as a statutory document 
(Gray, Bebbington, and Collison 2006) and, as a systematically produced document, attracts a 
degree of authenticity not associated with other such organizational outputs (Boyne and Law 
1991; Coy, Fischer, and Gordon 2001). Moreover, high-quality reports and accounts can lead 
to greater confidence in the organization, and greater confidence generates increased 
legitimacy (Steccolini 2004).  
Despite being widely debated, what constitutes accountability and how it should be 
operationalized remains unclear, chameleon-like and abstract (Patton 1992; Sinclair 1995). 
12 
 
Moreover, with respect to organizational communication, deciding what information should 
be provided is difficult (Reynolds and Yuthas 2008). Having considered different forms of 
accountability, to whom an organization might be accountable and how a duty to account 
might be discharged, the next section explains the research methods adopted in undertaking 
this research.  
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
 
In order to assess how the relationships NI NDPBs have with two key stakeholders impact 
upon their ability to discharge their accountability responsibilities effectively, this research 
utilized a survey and semi-structured interviews, with the latter developing the responses to 
the former. Summarizing the discussion above, accountability involves providing an account 
(not necessarily financial) and engaging with upward (e.g. sponsoring department) and 
downward (e.g. service users) stakeholders, taking into consideration their needs and views 
and providing explanations for actions. The elements or attributes of accountability include: 
transparency (Donaldson and Preston 1995; Independent Commission on Good Governance 
in Public Services 2004; HoCPASC 2014; Cabinet Office 2015); responsiveness (e.g. 
explaining and responding to stakeholders) (HoCPASC 2014); and responsible decision 
making (Fry 1995; Ebrahim 2003a; Cooper and Owen 2007). It may be operationalized by 
publicly defining the organisation’s values, mission and strategy, establishing strategies to 
accomplish objectives and measuring and reporting on outcomes (i.e. board effectiveness). 
Moreover, HoCPASC (2014) contends that accountability above all depends on relationships 
based on trust, openness and mutual support including those between the sponsoring 
department and the leadership of the public body. Therefore, drawing upon these themes, the 
main body of the survey comprised nineteen questions: questions 1 and 3 dealt with 
governance; questions 2 and 4-6 addressed values and mission; and the remainder focussed on 
organizational and board effectiveness, including stakeholder relationships (see Table 12). In 
addition, the questionnaire included a number of background questions relating to the NDPB 
and respondent, which are discussed below. 
Whilst the majority of questions were closed, respondents had the opportunity to develop 
some of their responses. Using OFMDFM (2014), which provides details of the 105 NDPBs 
sponsored by the NI Executive, as well as their board members, details of the online survey, 
which was open between October-December 2014, were sent to all NI NDPBs’ board 
members using contact details obtained from their websites or via the chief executive (CEO) 
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or chair. One hundred responses were received, with the vast majority (75 per cent) of 
respondents representing service delivery bodies (i.e. Executive and HSC NDPBs), and the 
remainder being involved in regulation (20 per cent) (i.e. Advisory, Tribunal and some 
‘Other’ NDPBs) and funding (5 per cent) (i.e. Executive and HSC NDPBs). This means that 
75 per cent of the NDPBs represented has experience of the frontline delivery of services.  
Using their annual budget as an indicator of size, 32 per cent of respondents represented 
‘small’ NDPBs (i.e. a budget of less than £5 million) and 40 per cent ‘large’ (a budget of over 
£50 million). If the number of employees is used as a measure of size, 33 per cent of 
respondents were from NDPBs employing less than fifty, whilst 52 per cent of respondents 
were from bodies employing more than 200. A sizeable majority of respondents had prior 
experience having held board appointments before (79 per cent), with 62 per cent having two 
or more previous appointments. Thus, while the views expressed include those from members 
sitting on their first boards (21 per cent), it should be noted that some respondents might come 
from the ‘revolving door’ cohort of NDPB appointees, who could be less critical of 
appointment processes and governance than newly appointees. With regard to the position of 
respondents, 20 per cent were chairs, 16 per cent CEOs, 48 per cent non-executive directors 
(NEDs) and 9 per cent executive directors (EDs). Seven respondents did not indicate their 
position.  
A semi-structured interview guide, informed by the theoretical issues and empirical 
findings discussed above, was developed in order to expand on some of the responses to the 
questionnaire. Specifically, the NDPB’s relationship with the sponsoring department and 
service users, from the public body’s perspective, was further investigated. With regard to the 
NDPB’s relationship with the sponsoring department, responsibility (‘governance 
delegation’) and decision making (‘independence’ and ‘risk management’) emerged as key 
issues. With regard to the NDPB’s relationship with services users, the main issue related to 
the effectiveness of communication. Moreover, given the emphasis placed on transparent 
public appointments in the context of accountability (Independent Commission on Good 
Governance in Public Services 2004; Skelcher et al. 2013; HocPAC 2014) this area was also 
discussed. Respondents who had indicated in the survey that they were willing to be 
interviewed were subsequently contacted by the researchers, with the interviews taking place 
between May-September 2015. Given the difficulties of gaining access to interviewees, NI’s 
provincial nature, the potential sensitivities of the matters being discussed and the 
researchers’ desire for the interviewees to be as candid as possible, each potential interviewee 
was informed (prior to agreeing to be interviewed) that the interviews would be reported in a 
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completely anonymised format so that specific statements could not be attributed to particular 
individuals. It was considered that such assurances were necessary to increase the number of 
participants and the quality of participation. However, each interviewee has been given a 
unique reference (I1-I27) so as to illustrate that the views are expressed by a range of 
individuals, enable the reader to identify comments from the same interviewee, while 
maintaining confidentiality, and reflect some of the diversity of opinions3. In total, the authors 
conducted twenty seven interviews, which ranged from one to two hours. All interviewees, 
each of whom held a senior role in their organization, allowed their interviews to be recorded, 
with notes also being taken. The tapes were transcribed immediately to ensure accuracy and 
comprehension.  
 
FINDINGS 
 
The Independent Commission on Good Governance in Public Services (2004) and 
International Federation of Accountants/Chartered Institute of Public Finance and 
Accountancy (2014) build upon the Nolan Principles (Committee on Standards in Public Life 
1995), one of which is accountability. Using a seven-point Likert scale, respondents were 
initially asked whether their board culture and its decision-making processes reflected the 
Nolan Principles, with ‘seven’ indicating a complete reflection. The results were positive, 
with an average score of 6.18 (see Table 1, question 1). Two noteworthy issues are: firstly, 
there was a high degree of recognition of the principles; and secondly, the high scoring further 
reflects the relevance respondents attach to the principles in terms of their application to 
decision making in practice. However, in the open responses to the questionnaire and the 
interviews, a number of participants expressed dissatisfaction with current decision-making 
processes, commenting that such processes were complex and that the proximity to decision 
making was further removed than expected when initially joining the board. This may be as a 
result of NI NDPBs not formulating strategy, but putting into practice that emanating from 
their sponsoring departments. Respondents and interviewees also referred to the protracted 
nature of decision making, with a common theme being ‘the civil service way of doing things’ 
(I13). Furthermore, there was a belief that process outweighed outcome, the result of which 
was a tendency for board members to be reactive rather than proactive and reticent about 
making decisions for fear of being criticized. This is discussed further when addressing the 
boards’ relationship with their sponsoring departments.  
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Table 1: Responses to questionnaire 
 
Question Likert Scale Results – Average Score 
1. How does your board’s decision 
making reflect the Nolan Principles? 
[1 = does not reflect, 7 = completely reflects]  
6.18 
2. Are vision and values at the forefront of 
decision making? 
[1 = never, 5 = all the time]  
3.64 
 Yes No Don’t Know 
3. Do corporate governance processes 
enhance decision making? 
 
89% 
 
7% 
 
4% 
4. Does your organisation have a mission 
statement? 
 
91% 
 
3% 
 
6% 
5. Is your mission statement used as part 
of the stakeholder engagement process? 
 
85% 
 
2% 
 
13% 
 Likert Scale Results – Average Score 
6. Do you find it difficult to adhere to 
your mission statement when making 
decisions? 
[1 = very easy, 7 = very difficult] 
3.55 
7. How effective is your board at 
promoting effective working 
relationships with executive 
management? 
[1 = not effective, 7 = very effective] 
5.49 
8. How effective is your board at fostering 
a culture of constructive challenge? 
[1 = not effective, 7 = very effective] 
5.42 
9. How effective is your board at taking a 
structured approach to succession 
planning? 
[1 = not effective, 7 = very effective] 
4.60 
10. How effective is your board at 
increasing citizen awareness of public 
body activities? 
[1 = not effective, 7 = very effective] 
4.63 
11. How effective is your public body at 
developing relationships with 
stakeholders? 
[1 = not effective, 7 = very effective] 
4.79 
12. How effective is your board at 
promoting effective working 
relationships with the sponsoring 
department? 
[1 = not effective, 7 = very effective] 
5.00 
13. How effective is your board at 
articulating organizational values? 
[1 = not effective, 7 = very effective] 
5.31 
14. How effective is your board at using 
evidence to enhance the quality of 
decision making? 
[1 = not effective, 7 = very effective] 
5.34 
15. How effective is your board at 
assessing the adequacy and relevance 
of the information it receives? 
[1 = not effective, 7 = very effective] 
5.32 
16. How effective is your board at making 
appropriate interventions? 
[1 = not effective, 7 = very effective] 
5.12 
17. How effective is your board at working 
to agreed deadlines? 
 
[1 = not effective, 7 = very effective] 
5.48 
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Question Likert Scale Results – Average Score 
18. How effective is your board at shaping 
board agendas and meetings? 
[1 = not effective, 7 = very effective] 
5.18 
19. How effective is your board at strategic 
management? 
[1 = not effective, 7 = very effective] 
5.28 
 
As discussed above, there are multiple instruments of accountability, with the statutory 
annual report and accounts being a well-established accountability mechanism. Indeed, 
HoCPASC (2014) states that accountability can be operationalized by the publication of such 
reports. Whilst participants were not specifically asked about the availability of their annual 
reports, a review of the websites of the 105 NI NDPBs revealed that eighty six (82 per cent) 
published such documents on their website. Those NDPBs that did not do so tended to be 
Advisory NDPBs, which typically do not have their own budgets, and their results were 
reported as part of their sponsoring department’s resource accounts. Another way of 
operationalizing accountability is for an organization to explain its values and progress in 
achieving its vision/mission (Drucker 1973; Ingley and Van der Walt 2001). Moreover, by 
demonstrating progress towards this, an organization can gain legitimacy from its 
stakeholders (Samkin and Schneider 2010). Using a five-point Likert scale, with ‘one’ 
representing ‘never’ and ‘five’ representing ‘all the time’, the results were positive with an 
average score of 3.64, indicating that vision and values frequently form part of decision 
making; therefore suggesting that these influenced how accountability was discharged (see 
Table 1, question 2). With regard to a mission statement, 91 per cent of respondents stated 
their organization had one, with 85 per cent sharing it with wider stakeholders (see Table 1, 
questions 4 and 5). Consequently, not only are such documents used by public bodies, but 
they also form part of the stakeholder engagement process, perhaps indicating that significant 
importance is attached to them. The board members were then asked about the difficulties 
faced achieving their organizational objectives whilst adhering to their mission statement. 
Using a seven-point Likert scale, with ‘one’ representing ‘very easy’ and ‘seven’ representing 
‘very difficult’, responses were spread fairly evenly across each of the scales with the average 
score being 3.55; this suggests that this can be problematic for some boards (see Table 1, 
question 6). 
Questionnaire respondents were also asked how effective their board was at certain 
activities, with ‘one’ representing ‘not effective’ and ‘seven’ ‘very effective’. Two 
characteristics of board behaviour deemed to be the most effective were: promoting effective 
working relationships with executive management (average score: 5.49) (see Table 1, 
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question 7); and fostering a culture of constructive challenge (average score: 5.42) (see Table 
1, question 8). The former suggests that respondents are satisfied with their dealings with one 
group of stakeholders, whilst the latter indicates a belief that there is a culture within the 
boards of NI NDPBs that enables constructive challenge; an important duty of a NED in 
discharging accountability to stakeholders. However, two of the least effective behaviours 
identified were: taking a structured approach to succession planning (average score: 4.60) (see 
Table 1, question 9), which is discussed later in the paper as it is linked with public 
appointments; and increasing citizen awareness of public body activities (average score: 4.63) 
(see Table 1, question 10). Interestingly, with regards to the second issue, whilst this was 
perceived as one of least effective activities, an average score of 4.79 suggests that typically 
respondents believe their organizations were effective in developing relationships with 
stakeholders (see Table 1, question 11). The relationship with the sponsoring department and 
service users, two key stakeholders, are now discussed in turn; this is followed by a 
consideration of public appointments. 
 
The relationship with the sponsoring department  
 
One of the aims of this paper is to examine the relationship between NDPBs and certain 
stakeholders. Whilst the findings reported above indicate that overall there is an effective 
working relationship between NDPBs and their stakeholders, (for example, see Table 1, 
question 12, the relationship with the sponsoring department was considered to be broadly 
effective (average score: 5.00), some of the open questionnaire and interview responses 
suggested that the relationship with the sponsoring department (in the parlance of Freeman 
(2010), a primary stakeholder) is transactional and procedural, which can cause accountability 
tensions (HoCPASC 2014). As these particular stakeholders have power, legitimacy and 
urgency, their claims are likely to be prioritized (Mitchell, Agle, and Wood 1997). While a 
minority acknowledged that the relationship with the sponsoring department was akin to that 
of an ALB, others used terms such as ‘autocratic’ (I11), ‘micromanagement’ (I15) and 
‘disproportionate scrutiny’ (I3) to describe the relationship, especially in situations where the 
NDPB was relatively small in comparison to the sponsoring department. Furthermore, it was 
reported that because of a tendency for civil servants to be risk averse, departments 
continually requested information from their NDPBs, which hampered their day-to-day 
activities. The relationship between NDPBs and their sponsoring department is discussed 
further below in the context of governance delegation, independence and risk management. 
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Governance delegation 
Governance delegation relates to the assigning of responsibility, with interviewee responses 
ranging from ‘clearly defined’ (I8) to ‘woeful’ (I11), with a representative comment of the 
latter being: 
‘…delegations [are] quite narrow….[the] government doesn’t allow ALBs to do their 
business…doesn’t understand the nature of the business, [it is] not best placed to run 
the business’. (I15) 
While delegation occurs, is clearly recognized and has improved, many contended that there 
was scope for further improvement. For example, a common concern was that the delegation 
of authority was overly complicated and could be simpler. Delegation issues were believed to 
arise from a number of factors. Firstly, it was suggested that too many individuals were 
involved in the delegation process (e.g. the Accounting Officer, the sponsoring department 
and the departmental minister, all of which had different perspectives). Secondly, scrutiny 
was considered disproportionate, with the preoccupation with process slowing down decision 
making; one interviewee referred to this as ‘wading through treacle’ (I9). Thirdly, there was 
discontent with the perceived approach of the Northern Ireland Civil Service (NICS) to 
apportioning responsibility when something went wrong and the impact of this on the 
relationship between the NICS and public body. Typical phrases to describe this were ‘blame 
culture’ (I22) and the ‘insularity of the civil service’ (I24). Fourthly, there was the cost and 
resource implications of compliance, particularly at a time when funding was being constantly 
reduced. Finally, the different roles that participants play in the board process were 
highlighted. For example, there was confusion over the responsibilities of the Accounting 
Officer and EDs in particular felt uncomfortable as they did not want to be seen as criticizing 
the CEO. This problem could be exacerbated by the fact that many board members to a 
certain degree ‘dipped in and out’ (I19).  
Suggestions were put forward by interviewees as to how governance delegations could be 
improved, one of which was examining the ED/NED relationship, with a common suggestion 
for improvement being that both parties meet outside of the boardroom in a more social 
setting. Indeed, there was a general feeling that it was important to invest time into building 
good relationships with all individuals involved in the governance process: 
‘Relationships are key to making delegations work. Following policy blindly from the 
department is never good’. (I8) 
Furthermore, it was suggested that there is a need to review governance terms of reference 
locally and the Management Statement and Financial Memorandum (MSFM) at a system-
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wide level. The MSFM sets out the broad framework within which a public body operates and 
there was a belief that it needed to focus on issues pertinent to governance. 
 
Independence 
With respect to NDPB independence, which impacts on board decision making and 
effectiveness and consequently accountability, there were calls for a greater understanding of 
the organization’s role, together with two related issues. Firstly, what type of body is the 
NDPB? This was seen as essential to understanding to whom the organization is accountable 
and thus enabling the board to work within this context with the executive team.  
‘[It is necessary] to know you are not an independent body, but a body with a high 
degree of independence’. (I26) 
Secondly, there were calls for greater clarity on to whom the NDPB is accountable. While 
interviewees believed that an arm’s-length relationship could operate effectively for both 
parties, there was ‘frustration at the short arms’ (I17) of the NICS compared to other UK 
jurisdictions as ‘independence only goes so far as operable under the sponsoring department’s 
authority’ (I18). It was contended that the particular form of government in NI resulted in 
continual renegotiation of issues at departmental level, which impacted upon NDPB business 
plans. There was consensus that board independence is linked to effectiveness, but close 
proximity to politicians in NI often negatively impacted upon this. Some politicians were 
perceived as being overly influential, meaning board members were reticent about voicing 
their opinion. 
 
Risk management 
Political influence was also seen as a factor that affected risk management in NDPBs, with a 
consequential impact on board decision making. Generally, while risk was seen as being 
better managed than it had been previously, it was an area identified as being particularly 
process heavy, often associated with ‘red tape’, box ticking and too much risk assessment. 
Interviewees commented that this area had become something of an industry in itself and one 
that was in need of review. A majority observed that the political system, and its functioning, 
impacted on how risk was managed at the NDPB level. For example: 
‘The PAC [Public Accounts Committee] [is a] blood sport...no issue with 
accountability, the issue becomes point scoring’. (I3) 
‘NICS risk aversion is exacerbated by the PAC and NI Audit Office’. (I13) 
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‘[The] risk aversion of the civil service…use of outside consultants to cover 
themselves and avoid the PAC’. (I20) 
Overall, it was argued that a sensible approach to risk management was required and that 
public bodies could not simply apply private sector risk management practices. There was 
also a belief that the threat of the PAC was overplayed, but that this did affect how risk was 
managed at both the departmental and NDPB levels, with departments operating to scrutinize, 
rather than advise and assist.  
Moreover, it was contended that decision making was influenced by the ‘civil service 
way of doing things’ (I13) where there was no individual incentive to take risks due to the 
system penalising people for taking judgements around risk. Risk aversion was perceived to 
be part of the ‘NICS’s DNA’ (I20) due to a disproportionate sensitivity to criticism, and it 
was felt that people ‘who don’t make mistakes get promoted’ (I20), which leads to the wrong 
type of behaviour. Therefore, public sector boards did not want to take risks, or took an 
inordinate period of time to reach a decision: 
‘[The] willingness to stand up to be counted when the organization is unfairly 
criticized is impacted by a lack of belief and confidence that they are going to be 
supported…this makes people risk averse’. (I17) 
A further manifestation of NICS risk aversion was a culture of wanting to know everything, 
which led to demands from multiple sources for the same information which slowed down 
NDPB decision-making processes. Furthermore, it was acknowledged that longstanding board 
members had a habit of stifling newer members who might be more willing to take risks.  
Responding to how public bodies can more meaningfully engage with risk as a key 
corporate governance issue, interviewees advised that: there needed to be better compatibility 
between the department and NDPB risk register; it was necessary to ‘push the risk appetite’ 
(I24), particularly due to funding restrictions, as organizations were going to fundamentally 
change; risk management processes needed to be challenged in line with the priorities of a 
minister’s wishes; and with regard to risk registers, it was necessary to ensure that issues are 
captured in a ‘meaningful amount of pages’ (I26) so that they become ‘dynamic documents’ 
(I5). It was suggested that the arm’s-length principle should be safeguarded, with the 
understanding that NDPBs would be severely penalised if they acted illegally. It was further 
highlighted that a more mature political environment was needed if the task of manging risk 
was to be less daunting.  
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The relationship with users 
 
According to Mitchell, Agle, and Wood (1997), dependant stakeholders are those who have 
legitimate claims, but depend on the power of others to pursue them. In the parlance of 
Donaldson and Preston (1995), the relationship with the main users of NDPB services was 
seen as normative in nature; and, given their position as service users (or consumers), they 
can be categorized as ‘primary stakeholders’ (Freeman 2010). Notwithstanding, several 
interviewees opined that their NDPBs were not engaging with service users in a meaningful 
way and that measures to increase awareness of their activities were perceived as ineffective. 
It was considered essential that NDPBs engaged with these stakeholders, despite such 
processes being particularly time and resource intensive. Therefore, the processes needed to 
be underpinned by an effective communication strategy linked to the organization’s values if 
they were to have traction, and the NDPB needed to be clear about its purpose. Moreover, 
engagement needed to be a continuous process in order to be sustainable. However, given the 
prevailing pressures on resources, this was not seen as an easy task: 
‘[The] problem with the public sector… stakeholder engagement is the first thing to 
go when you need it most…unfortunately time, money and energy is dissipated when 
dealing with a crisis’. (I9) 
Interviewees also pointed out that it is difficult to secure effective engagement with the wider 
public unless the matter the NDPB is dealing with affects them directly; although public 
bodies have attempted to widen stakeholder engagement by using different venues for board 
meetings. This was seen as being important in presenting ‘a board that is not faceless’ (I11). 
While a small number of NDPBs had considered holding meetings externally to encourage 
greater attendance, there was concern about accusations of wasting taxpayers’ money as 
boardrooms are a sunk cost. Others had experimented with podcasting meetings and making 
these available on their websites, with this practice being considered successful based upon 
the number of ‘hits’. Notwithstanding, NI was thought to be a good location for developing 
such initiatives, given the proximity to the local populace.  
With regard to how actual experiences relating to public engagement had been evidenced, 
interviewees were generally positive with the feeling that ‘openness is appreciated by the 
public’ (I8); however, there were two main concerns about how these processes could be 
taken forward in the future. First, an uncertainty about the best time to do this, with 
interviewees stating it was ‘difficult to know when and how to do it’ (I17) and ‘public bodies 
are shy about coming out to meet the public’ (I3). Second, resource constraints were 
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identified as being a factor that would potentially impact these activities, with social media 
being raised as a solution. However, it was emphasised that such communication needed to be 
clear and effective and not trivialize the message.  
 
Public appointments 
 
The Independent Commission on Good Governance in Public Services (2004), Skelcher et al. 
(2013) and HoCPASC (2014) highlight the importance of transparent public appointments in 
the context of good governance, with succession planning being a component of this (Public 
Sector Commission 2016). The questionnaire results confirmed that succession planning was 
seen as one of the least effective board behaviours, possibly due to the nature of the role and 
low, or non-existent, remuneration. Moreover, given the time commitment required, 
vacancies tend to attract a certain type of applicant, mainly semi-retired, professional males. 
This also led to similar individuals sitting on multiple boards, which could result in conflicts 
of interest. However, whilst several interviewees would like to see younger board members, 
such people needed the appropriate skills and competences to fulfil the role (e.g. dealing with 
multi-million pound budgets). One interviewee referred to this as ‘diversity within reason’ 
(I6). Another factor that could be deterring potential candidates is the media scrutiny that 
public sector officials can attract, possibly due to local broadcasters and newspapers having a 
fairly narrow scope for material. Additionally, the public appointments system was seen as 
process heavy and lacking transparency, with NDPBs preferring to: 
‘appoint the wrong person with the right process than the right person with the wrong 
process’. (I13) 
Therefore, interviewees believed that it was necessary to expand both the diversity and skill 
sets of board members and streamline the public appointments system. Consequently, the 
concerns of HoCPASC (2014) that public appointments are not sufficiently transparent, 
representative or accountable appear justified. In April 2016, the NI Executive agreed targets 
for the equal representation of men and women on NDPB boards, with an equal number of 
women as Chairs by 2020/21 (Commissioner for Public Appointments Northern Ireland 
2016). Thus, in some areas of social diversity there are encouraging signs; however it was 
acknowledged that more work needs to be done to make posts more attractive to all members 
of society and remove redundant or superfluous processes from application procedures. The 
use of informal leaders to smooth the process of strategic succession planning on the board 
was proposed (e.g. a Deputy Chair or another individual supportive of the group as a whole), 
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with staggered, and longer, terms of appointment also being seen as ways of improving the 
current system.  
  
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper presents the results of a survey of, and interviews with, members of NI NDPB 
boards. Overall, the findings indicate that although there was a general belief that these bodies 
are effective in discharging their accountability duties, there remain areas where this could be 
enhanced. These include: balancing compliance with outcomes; relationships with sponsoring 
departments and service users; and public appointments. 
The governance system was viewed as process-heavy and following a process was 
perceived as being more important than the outcome. Therefore, it is recommended that 
boards embrace modes of working that go beyond simple compliance issues, as is arguably 
the case with much governance guidance. For example, the Professional Accountants in 
Business Committee (2004) promotes a holistic view of governance that considers two 
dimensions: conformance, encompassing what would be commonly recognised as governance 
issues; and performance, to help the board make strategic decisions and understand its risk 
appetite and key performance drivers. It is contended that this approach will facilitate boards 
in becoming less embroiled in process.  
With respect to relationships with sponsoring departments and service users, which 
Broadbent, Dietrich, and Laughlin (1996) refer to as upward and downward stakeholders 
respectively, NDPBs should have an externally-focussed notion of accountability towards the 
former and a felt responsibility towards the latter (Fry 1995; Gregory 1995). Although, 
according to Fry (1995) balancing both stances has the potential to create tension. The 
impression gained from the survey and interviews was a sense of frustration at how these 
relationships operated in practice. With the sponsoring departments this frustration was due to 
what was typically referred to as a lack of an arm’s-length relationship, whilst with users it 
arose from not being able to engage as effectively as desired. Indeed, there was no suggestion 
of strategically utilizing a discourse, self-promotion or impression management (Chen and 
Roberts 2010; Beelitz and Merkl-Davies 2012). Therefore, although NDPBs were keen to 
increase their transparency there was a feeling that communication with users could be 
improved. One way of enhancing the relationship with the sponsoring department would be 
for the NICS to undertake a review of engagement processes to ensure consistency. 
Moreover, communication processes between the NICS and public bodies need to be 
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enhanced, particularly with regard to excessive information requests, so that the ability of the 
NDBP to fulfil its role is unhindered. Thus, a move away from what Roberts (1991) refers to 
as a hierarchical form of accountability to one more akin to socialising could free board 
members to devote more time to their core activities. As NI government departments have 
recently been restructured and reduced from twelve to nine, this provides an opportunity for a 
more consistent approach to their relationships with their NDPBs in order that the latter are 
treated more like ALBs. With regard to improving communication and thereby relationships 
with users, particularly in a time of austerity, greater use of social media and other interactive 
web-based tools could assist, without being seen as a waste of resources. This could lead to 
more consultation and user involvement in decision-making processes, which according to 
Laughlin (1996) is a form of communal accountability.  
Finally, with regard to public appointments, the recently announced targets for female 
appointees will address some of the social diversity issues of NDPB boards; however other 
barriers still need to be overcome to make the process fully transparent and seen as open to a 
wider pool of applicants. 
The austerity that continues to impinge on the budgets of NDPBs has clearly had an 
adverse impact on their activities; however, there is much that could still be done to enhance 
their accountability. In this regard, research that compares the board practices of NDPBs in NI 
with those of other UK jurisdictions could lead to more sharing of best practice, as would a 
move away from the silo mentality that often beleaguers public sector organizations. As this 
paper only focusses on two stakeholders from the NDPB’s perspective, the sponsoring 
department and the user, future research could consider a wider range and ascertain whether, 
as suggested by Mitchell, Agle and Wood (1997), a ranking of competing stakeholder claims 
is conducted. Therefore, such research could address which groups or individuals are 
considered stakeholders, what taxonomies, if any, NDPBs use to categorize these 
stakeholders, how do senior management deal with competing stakeholder demands and how 
is the dynamic nature of stakeholders dealt with, i.e. do senior management take a proactive 
or reactive approach? Moreover, the views of the sponsoring department and users could also 
be sought in order to ascertain if they concur with the assessment provided by NDPBs 
regarding the latter’s discharge of accountability.  
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1 The term annual report here refers to documents which comprise an organization’s annual financial statements 
as well as narrative reports by management (e.g. directors’ or trustees’ reports). 
2 The responses to all questions in Table 1 are not discussed in the paper. 
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3 Whilst NI offers unique access to key public sector decision makers and a subsequent richness of data, the 
provincial nature of the country makes these people more easily identifiable than they might be in other parts of 
the UK. Therefore the researchers were constrained ethically with regards to the extent to which interviewees 
could be identified. All interviewees only agreed to participate on the condition of complete anonymity as 
attaching a label such as ‘ED Health’ could lead to that person being identified. 
